

Title 1: Fair and (constrained) efficient mechanisms for coordinated refugee resettlement (joint with Ryoga Doi)

Abstract 1: The world witnesses a refugee crisis where millions of refugee families are left displaced from their homeland. To study how fairly and efficiently clear the congested refugee resettlement market, we propose a new framework named the coordinated refugee resettlement problem. The problem extends the framework of Delacretaz et al. (2023) in that localities can coordinate to trade their capacities to efficiently accommodate refugees. We construct a new mechanism that achieves a constrained efficient matching among localities and refugee families, which balances fairness and efficiency.

Title 2: Catchment area design with incomplete distributional preferences

Abstract 2: On the quality of childhood education, evidence shows the importance of peer effects from classmates. To enhance peer effects among students, we consider a problem of sorting students to schools through adjusting catchment areas. Under realistic preferences, we show that a simple mechanism achieves a desirable student distribution along with school incentive compatibility.