On evaluationwise strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences

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Abstract

We propose a concept of evaluationwise strategy-proofness for social choice correspondences. We assume that manipulation occurs only if a voter can have a more acceptable social choice by the manipulation. We show that there is no social choice correspondence satisfying anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and evaluationwise strategy-proofness when the number of the voters is a multiple of 4. However, we also give several possibility theorems which clearly show that the concept of evaluationwise strategy-proofness gives us much more positive results than the concept of strategy-proofness.