Dynamics of Firms and Trade in General Equilibrium

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Figure 1a. Aggregate exchange rate disconnect (levels)





Figure 1b. Aggregate exchange rate disconnect (HP filtered)



$$Corr(Exp, REER) = 0.47^{***}$$
 $Corr(Imp, REER) = 0.19_{(0.16)}$

All

Sample

0.374

(0.049)***

0.398

(0.055)***

0.378

(0.080)***

2.112

(0.079)***

6.289

(1.596)***

325.8

0.042

9.997

log RER

 $\log Y^*$

log Agg TFP

log Firm TFP

Cons

F-stat

Adj. R-sq.

Obs.

(1)

(2)High Profitability

0.284

(0.110)**

0.315

(0.125)**

1.537

(0.181)***

2.158

(0.169)***

7.744

(3.611)**

118.6

0.122

2.034

Size differentiation is done by 75th percentile. * p < 0.1; *** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

(3)Low Profitability

0.393

(0.054)***

0.417

(0.061)***

0.106

-0.089

2.091

(0.089)***

5.963

(1.771)***

228.2

0.029

7.963

Table 1. Exports regression, Kaigin panel

Employment Employment (0.061)***(0.068)***

(5)

Small

0.406

0.424

(0.076)***

0.301

(0.111)***

1.898

(0.101)***

4.803

(2.190)**

152.5

0.002

6.448

(4)

Big

0.338

0.305

(0.072)***

0.389

(0.104)***

2.721

(0.121)***

10.412

(2.083)***

250.2

0.171

3.549

(7)

Small

Sales

0.369

(0.065)***

0.316

(0.073)***

0.3

(0.106)***

2.253

(0.102)***

7.79

(2.107)***

196.2

0.022

6.908

(6)

Big

Sales

0.389

(0.063)***

0.594

(0.073)***

0.588

(0.105)***

1.726

(0.111)***

2.55

-2.109

171.7

0.126

3.089

In Kaigin data, the average total sales of exporters is twice as large as non-exporters \rightarrow Consistent with Melitz (2003)


But

Correlation between firm size and export dummy is weak 0.09

Correlation between firm size and export share of exporters is even weaker 0.03

Many firms have negative profit, 8% in total and 11% among exporters

→ We consider heterogeneous productivity of each product and each firm produces multiple products



Small Open Economy Model

A continuum of home firm $h \in \mathcal{H}_t$. Firm h produces I_{ht} number of differentiated products for home and export market

$$q_{hit}^H = a_{hit} Z_t \left(rac{l_{hit}^H}{\gamma_L}
ight)^{\gamma_L} \left(rac{m_{hit}^{*H}}{1-\gamma_L}
ight)^{1-\gamma_L}, ext{ for } i=1,2,..,I_{ht}$$

$$q_{hit}^F = a_{hit} Z_t \left[\left(rac{l_{hit}^F}{\gamma_L}
ight)^{\gamma_L} \left(rac{m_{hit}^{*F}}{1 - \gamma_L}
ight)^{1 - \gamma_L} - \phi
ight], ext{ for } i = 1, 2, ... I_{ht}$$

Home output for home and export markets are produced as

$$egin{array}{ll} Q_t^H &= \left[\int_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t} \left(\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I_{ht}} q_{hit}^{H rac{ heta-1}{ heta}}
ight) dh
ight]^{rac{ heta}{ heta-1}} \ Q_t^F &= \left[\int_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t} \left(\sum\limits_{i=1}^{I_{ht}} q_{hit}^{F rac{ heta-1}{ heta}}
ight) dh
ight]^{rac{ heta}{ heta-1}} \end{array}$$

A new entrant who pays a sunk cost κ_{Et} at date t draws an opportunity of producing a new products from date t+1 with probability λ_E . The productivity of the new product is distributed as

Prob
$$(a_{hit} \le a) = F(a) = 1 - a^{-\alpha}$$
, for $a \in [1, \infty)$ where $\alpha > 1$ and $\alpha > \theta - 1$.

A firm must pay the fixed maintenance cost κ for each product in order to produce and maintain its productivity

$$a_{hit+1} = \left\{ egin{array}{l} a_{hit}, \ ext{with probability } \mathbf{1} - \delta \ 0, \ ext{with probability } \delta \end{array}
ight.$$

In addition, each maintained product yields an opportunity to produce another new product with probability $\lambda\delta<\delta$ with the same Pareto distribution.

Each firm can produce many products. Each product multiplies and dies like "amoeba."

Home final goods market

$$Q_t^H = C_t + \kappa_{Et} N_{Et} + \kappa N_t$$

 N_{Et} is measure of entering firms, N_t is measure of differentiated products maintained, and

$$\kappa_{Et} = \kappa_E \left(\frac{N_{Et}}{N_E}\right)^{\eta}, \ \eta > 0$$
 (1)

The representative household supplies labor L_t , consumes final goods C_t and holds home and foreign real bonds D_t and D_t^* to maximize its expected utility

$$U_0 = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\ln C_t - \psi_0 \frac{L_t^{1+1/\psi}}{1+1/\psi} + \xi_t^* \ln D_t^* \right)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$C_{t} + \kappa_{E} N_{Et} + \kappa N_{t} + D_{t} + \epsilon_{t} D_{t}^{*}$$

$$= w_{Lt} L_{t} + \Pi_{t} + R_{t-1} D_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t} R_{t-1}^{*} D_{t-1}^{*}$$

 $oldsymbol{\xi}_t^*$: utility (liquidity) shock to foreign bond holding

Foreigners do not hold home bond $\rightarrow D_t = 0$

Foreign bond holding of home household

$$D_t^* = R_{t-1}^* D_{t-1}^* + p_t^F Q_t^F - M_t^{*H}$$

where $M_t^{st H}$ is total import of intermediate input

Foreign aggregate demand for home exports are given by

$$Q_t^F = (p_t^F)^{-\varphi} Y_t^*$$

where Y_t^* is an exogenous foreign demand

Competitive Equilibrium

All firms choose to pay the fixed maintenance cost

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \delta + \delta \lambda) N_t + \lambda_E N_{Et}$$
 (2)

Price of differentiated goods is a mark-up over the unit cost and the price index of home final goods at home is

$$1 = p_t^H = \left[\int_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{I_{ht}} p_{hit}^{H}^{1-\theta} \right) dh \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} = \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \frac{w_t}{\overline{a} N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} Z_t} \quad (3)$$

$$w_t = (w_{Lt})^{\gamma_L} \epsilon_t^{1-\gamma_L}, \; \overline{a} \equiv \left[\int_1^\infty a^{ heta-1} dF(a)
ight]^{rac{1}{ heta-1}} = \left(rac{lpha}{lpha+1- heta}
ight)^{rac{1}{ heta-1}}$$

Only products with higher than \underline{a}_t productivity is exported.

$$\underline{a}_{t} = \left[\frac{\alpha \left(\theta - 1\right) \phi \overline{a} Z_{t} N_{t}^{\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}}}{\alpha + 1 - \theta} \right]^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\alpha (\theta - 1) + (\alpha + 1 - \theta)(1 - \varphi)}} \tag{4}$$

The input composite market equilibrium is

$$X_{t} = \left(\frac{L_{t}}{\gamma_{L}}\right)^{\gamma_{L}} \left(\frac{M_{t}^{*H}}{1 - \gamma_{L}}\right)^{1 - \gamma_{L}} = \frac{1}{\gamma_{L}(\psi_{0}C_{t})^{\psi}} \left(\frac{w_{t}^{1 - \gamma_{L} + \psi}}{\epsilon_{t}^{(1 - \gamma_{L})(1 + \psi)}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_{L}}}$$

$$(5)$$

$$= X_t^H + \phi \frac{\theta \alpha + 1 - \theta}{\alpha + 1 - \theta} \underline{a_t}^{-\alpha} N_t \tag{6}$$

Free entry condition is

$$\kappa_{Et} = \lambda_E E_t \left(\Lambda_{t,t+1} \overline{V}_{t+1} \right)$$
: free entry (7)

where the value function of the average product

$$\overline{V}_t = \overline{\pi}_t - \kappa + (1 - \delta + \delta \lambda) E_t \left(\Lambda_{t,t+1} \overline{V}_{t+1} \right)$$
 (8)

where $\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta C_t/C_{t+1}$ and

$$\overline{\pi}_t = w_t \left| \frac{X_t}{(\theta - 1)N_t} - \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \phi \underline{a}_t^{-\alpha} \right| \tag{9}$$

The final goods market clearing implies

$$C_t + \kappa_{Et} N_{Et} + \kappa N_t = \overline{a} N_t^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} Z_t X_t^H \tag{10}$$

Net foreign assets evolve as

$$\epsilon_t D_t^* = \epsilon_t R_{t-1}^* D_{t-1}^* + \underline{a_t}^{\frac{(\alpha+1-\theta)(1-\varphi)}{\theta-1}} \epsilon_t^{\varphi} Y_t^* - (1-\gamma_L) w_t X_t$$
 (11)

Home demand for home bond and foreign bond imply

$$1 = R_t E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}) \tag{12}$$

$$\epsilon_t - R_t^* E_t \left(\Lambda_{t,t+1} \epsilon_{t+1} \right) = \xi_t^* \frac{C_t}{D_t^*}$$
 (13)

(1 – 13) determine $w_t, \underline{a}_t, X_t, X_t^H, C_t, \epsilon_t, R_t, \overline{V}_t, \overline{\pi}_t, \kappa_{Et}, N_{Et}, N_{Et}$ and N_{t+1} and N_t^* as a function of the state variables $\mathcal{M}_t = (N_t, D_{t-1}^*, Z_t, \xi_t^*, Y_t^*, R_t^*)$

β Discount factor

Elasticity of substitution between products

Table 2a. Baseline parameterization

 $0.92 \\ 4.19$

0.49

0.41

1.67

1

 10^{6}

0.28

0.01

1.05

ψ	Frisch elasticity of labor supply	6.02
ψ_0	Labor disutility	12.84
γ_L	Labor share	0.85
α	Productivity distribution shape parameter	3.64
φ	Elasticity of foreign demand	0.75
ϕ	Export cost	3.14
κ	Maintenance cost	16.57
κ_E	Entry cost	89.26
η	Elasticity of entry cost	0.1
δ	Probability of losing product	0.12

Probability of drawing new product for incumbent

Probability of producing new product for entrant

Std. dev. of noise for sales

Steady state foreign demand

Steady state liquidity shock

Steady state foreign interest rate

Steady state aggregate productivity

Steady state govt. expenditure / cons.

 λ_E

 $\frac{\sigma}{Z}$

 Y^*

G/C

 ξ^*

 R^*

Model Data 0.560.66 $\epsilon D^*/Y$ 0.200.19Exp/Y0.120.12 N_E/N 0.100.15Mean $\log Rev$ 17.7717.77

 $SD \log Rev$

Mean $\log Dom$

 $SD \log Dom$

 $SD \log Exp$

Mean PR

SD PR

#Exp/N

Corr PR, $\log Rev$

Corr ES, $\log Rev$

Mean $\log Exp$

Table 2b. Steady state moments (aggregate and cross-sectional)

1.42

17.65

1.41

16.03

2.09

0.03

0.06

0.39

0.07

0.17

1.84

17.66

1.84

15.58

1.85

0.15

0.15

1.00

0.71

0.32

Figure 3a. Cross sectional distribution of total sales by export status: Kaigin data




Figure 3b. Cross sectional distribution of total sales by export status: Model




 Table 3a. Calibration of stochastic processes

	Efficient	Subjective		
Standard	deviation			
$\sigma_Z~(\%)$	0.87	0.59		
σ_{Y^*} (%)	1.35	5.46		
σ_G (%)	0.83	0.61		
σ_{ξ^*} (%)	22.05	79.16		
Autocorrelation				
$ ho_Z$	0.55	0.73		
$ ho_{Y^*}$	0.94	0.84		
$ ho_G$	0.95	0.95		
$ ho_{arepsilon^*}$	0.95	0.27		

 Table 3b.
 Sample and simulated moments

$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		Data	Efficient	Subjective			
SD Gov / SD GDP 0.63 0.83 0.59 (0.11) SD Inv / SD GDP 3.13 2.80 2.47 (0.13) SD Exp / SD GDP 4.63 2.41 4.24 (0.70) SD RER (%) 3.52 3.07 3.57 (0.31) Autocorrelation AC(1) GDP 0.55 0.34 0.40 (0.15) AC(1) Gov 0.65 0.49 0.49 (0.07) AC(1) Inv 0.58 0.30 0.23 (0.13) AC(1) Exp 0.36 0.45 0.37 (0.18) AC(1) RER 0.49 0.46 0.28 (0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08	Standard deviation						
SD Gov / SD GDP 0.63 0.83 0.59 (0.11) SD Inv / SD GDP 3.13 2.80 2.47 (0.13) SD Exp / SD GDP 4.63 2.41 4.24 (0.70) SD RER (%) 3.52 3.07 3.57 (0.31) Autocorrelation AC(1) GDP 0.55 0.34 0.40 (0.15) AC(1) Gov 0.65 0.49 0.49 (0.07) AC(1) Inv 0.58 0.30 0.23 (0.13) AC(1) Exp 0.36 0.45 0.37 (0.18) AC(1) RER 0.49 0.46 0.28 (0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08	SD GDP (%)	0.88	0.93	0.96			
$\begin{array}{c} & (0.11) \\ \text{SD Inv / SD GDP} & 3.13 & 2.80 & 2.47 \\ & (0.13) & \\ \text{SD Exp / SD GDP} & 4.63 & 2.41 & 4.24 \\ & (0.70) & \\ \text{SD RER (\%)} & 3.52 & 3.07 & 3.57 \\ & & (0.31) & \\ \hline \\ \text{Autocorrelation} & \\ \text{AC(1) GDP} & 0.55 & 0.34 & 0.40 \\ & & (0.15) & \\ \text{AC(1) Gov} & 0.65 & 0.49 & 0.49 \\ & & (0.07) & \\ \text{AC(1) Inv} & 0.58 & 0.30 & 0.23 \\ & & (0.13) & \\ \text{AC(1) Exp} & 0.36 & 0.45 & 0.37 \\ & & (0.18) & \\ \text{AC(1) RER} & 0.49 & 0.46 & 0.28 \\ & & (0.06) & \\ \hline \\ \text{Correlation with GDP} & \\ \text{Corr Gov, GDP} & 0.08 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\ \hline \end{array}$		(0.10)					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	SD Gov / SD GDP	0.63	0.83	0.59			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.11)					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	SD Inv / SD GDP	3.13	2.80	2.47			
$\begin{array}{c} \text{SD RER (\%)} & \begin{array}{c} (0.70) \\ 3.52 \\ (0.31) \end{array} \\ \\ \hline \text{Autocorrelation} \\ \text{AC(1) GDP} & \begin{array}{c} 0.55 \\ 0.55 \\ 0.34 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.40 \\ 0.15 \end{array} \\ \\ \text{AC(1) Gov} & \begin{array}{c} 0.65 \\ 0.65 \\ 0.49 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.49 \\ 0.07 \end{array} \\ \\ \text{AC(1) Inv} & \begin{array}{c} 0.58 \\ 0.58 \\ 0.30 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.23 \\ 0.13 \end{array} \\ \\ \text{AC(1) Exp} & \begin{array}{c} 0.36 \\ 0.18 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.45 \\ 0.18 \end{array} \\ \\ \text{AC(1) RER} & \begin{array}{c} 0.49 \\ 0.46 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.28 \\ 0.06 \end{array} \\ \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ \text{Correlation with GDP} \\ \hline \\ \text{Corr Gov, GDP} & \begin{array}{c} 0.08 \\ 0.08 \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} 0.12 \\ 0.08 \end{array} \end{array} \end{array}$		(0.13)					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	SD Exp / SD GDP		2.41	4.24			
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.70)					
Autocorrelation AC(1) GDP 0.55 0.34 0.40 (0.15) AC(1) Gov 0.65 0.49 0.49 (0.07) AC(1) Inv 0.58 0.30 0.23 (0.13) AC(1) Exp 0.36 0.45 0.37 (0.18) AC(1) RER 0.49 0.46 0.28 (0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08	SD RER $(\%)$	3.52	3.07	3.57			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.31)					
$\begin{array}{c} & (0.15) \\ AC(1) \ Gov & 0.65 & 0.49 & 0.49 \\ & (0.07) & \\ AC(1) \ Inv & 0.58 & 0.30 & 0.23 \\ & (0.13) & \\ AC(1) \ Exp & 0.36 & 0.45 & 0.37 \\ & & (0.18) & \\ AC(1) \ RER & 0.49 & 0.46 & 0.28 \\ & & (0.06) & \\ \hline \\ Correlation \ with \ GDP \\ Corr \ Gov, \ GDP & 0.08 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\ \end{array}$	Autocorrelation						
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	AC(1) GDP	0.55	0.34	0.40			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.15)					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	AC(1) Gov	0.65	0.49	0.49			
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		· /					
$\begin{array}{c ccccc} AC(1) \ Exp & 0.36 & 0.45 & 0.37 \\ & & (0.18) & \\ AC(1) \ RER & 0.49 & 0.46 & 0.28 \\ & & (0.06) & & \\ \hline \\ Correlation \ with \ GDP & \\ Corr \ Gov, \ GDP & 0.08 & 0.12 & 0.08 \\ \end{array}$	AC(1) Inv		0.30	0.23			
(0.18) AC(1) RER 0.49 0.46 0.28 (0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08		` /					
AC(1) RER 0.49 0.46 0.28 (0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08	AC(1) Exp		0.45	0.37			
(0.06) Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08		,					
Correlation with GDP Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08	AC(1) RER		0.46	0.28			
Corr Gov, GDP 0.08 0.12 0.08							
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Correlation with GDP						
(0.19)	Corr Gov, GDP		0.12	0.08			
, ,		(0.19)					
Corr Inv, GDP 0.96 0.97 0.85	Corr Inv, GDP		0.97	0.85			
(0.01)		` /					
Corr Exp, GDP 0.55 0.08 0.53	Corr Exp, GDP		0.08	0.53			
(0.19)		\ /					
Corr RER, GDP 0.42 -0.04 -0.59	Corr RER, GDP		-0.04	-0.59			
(0.16)		(0.16)					

Data and output from the model are HP filtered. HAC robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.

Figure 4. Impulse response to TFP shock Z




Figure 5. Impulse response to foreign demand shock Y^*




Figure 7. Impulse response to liquidity shock ξ^*




Table 6. Panel regression on simulated data: Profitability interaction

	Data	Model			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log RER	0.527	1.95	1.95	2.00	1.65
	(0.065)***	(-7.4, 11.07)	(-0.02, 3.8)	(0.11, 3.84)	(1.18, 2.21)
$\log RER \times PR$	-1.604		-0.25	-1.81	-0.58
	(0.954)*		(-0.3, -0.23)	(-4.11, 0.56)	(-1.39, 0.27)
$\log Y^*$	0.383	2.19	2.28	2.36	2.17
	(0.055)***	(-17.9, 23.33)	(-2.06, 6.61)	(-1.88, 6.69)	(0.9, 3.29)
$\log Y^* \times PR$	-0.357	, ,		-2.32	-0.83
	(0.155)**			(-5.72, 1.25)	(-2.03, 0.43)
$\log Agg TFP$	-0.678	-0.83	-2.32	-2.64	-1.16
	(0.103)***	(-29.32, 24.36)	(-8.62, 2.99)	(-8.89, 2.21)	(-2.77, -0.17)
$\log Agg TFP \times PR$	21.09			7.76	1.16
	(1.436)***			(0.24, 16.04)	(-1.26, 3.96)
log Firm TFP	2.295				0.98
	(0.084)***				(0.97, 0.99)
Cons	7.573				
	(1.626)***				
# Obs.	9,994	26,752			
		(10536, 38688)			

For the model, 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (with 1,000 simulations) are shown in parenthesis.

Figure 8. Response of exports to the exchange rate at extensive and intensive margins

